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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Special Assistant to the DCI

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FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Community Security Group

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SUBJECT: [redacted] Proposal

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1. [redacted] As deliberations progress on review of [redacted] [redacted] proposed modification of our compartmentation systems there is growing concern about the amount of quite sensitive intelligence which will be published without the extra protection afforded by our compartmentation programs.

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2. [redacted] This concern is based on the potential for access to this material by individuals cleared on the basis of unsatisfactory personnel security criteria. In example,

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figures reasonably available to permit determination of the size of this population. Rough estimates are that there may be as many as one million holders of SECRET or TOP SECRET clearances in the uniformed services.

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3. [redacted] The concern is also based on the fact that there are many individuals in the civil agencies approved for access to classified material who have not agreed to any secrecy stipulation; individuals who have never been required to sign a secrecy agreement in connection with routine receipt of SECRET or TOP SECRET information.

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25X1 4. [] The concern is further generated out of the knowledge that there is a practice of making classified defense information available to foreign defense counter-parts unless there is a specific NOFORN caveat on the material. Under these practices, it could result that much National Foreign Intelligence recently placed in the main stream of defense classified material after removal from compartmentation controls could also flow to foreign governments.

25X1 5. [] As security advisor to the Working Group, I propose that serious consideration be given to addressing these security concerns in the current exercise. The following suggestions are offered for consideration.

25X1 a. [] Re National Foreign Intelligence - At the present time there is no distinct category of National Foreign Intelligence in the class of material identified as National Security Information. At the same time E.O. 12065 and E.O. 12036 refer to the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence and sources and methods of intelligence. There is also legislation tasking the DCI on this matter. Over the years there have been attempts to identify "intelligence information" as a distinct category of National Security Information without success. I believe that another attempt should be made at this time in view of the possible removal of extra controls extant over sensitive intelligence. I would suggest that National Foreign Intelligence can be categorized, perhaps as all information published by the National Agencies, the CIA, the NSA, the NPIC, and NFAC. Difficulties within the National/Tactical interface arena can be resolved. The advantages to establishing a category of material identified as National Foreign Intelligence would permit the DCI to decree common standards of safeguards as required by E.O. 12036 and legislation.

25X1 b. [] At the present time there is a uniform personnel security criteria for access to SCI material, DCID 1/14. Toward alleviation of concern about unsatisfactory personnel security criteria, it is proposed that consideration be addressed to adoption of a requirement of higher standards of investigation or other determinants in the selection of personnel for approval for access to classified non-compartmented National Foreign Intelligence.

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c. A secrecy agreement should be made a condition precedent to access to classified National Foreign Intelligence for all potential recipients. While this requirement cannot be imposed as a condition of employment in the civil agencies of the government according to a ruling by the Civil Service Commission, there is no barrier to requiring a secrecy agreement as a prior condition of access to intelligence materials. The practice has long been established in those civil agencies in receipt of compartmented intelligence. All individuals in the civil agencies nominated and approved for access to any category of Special Compartmented Intelligence (SI, TK, etc.,) are required and have executed a secrecy agreement.

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d. While there is discussion about prohibiting all compartmented information from being released to foreign governments without specific approval, the new procedures are silent about controls over material that will be decompartmented. It is proposed that the "NOFORN-Except" rule be imposed over all National Foreign Intelligence and that it be clearly stipulated that all exceptions will be subject to centralized authority and registration.

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